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Briefing Paper 
PRIVATISATION 
by David Simpson, Fraser of Allander Institute 
Wiuh the appointment of a new Secretary of State for Trade and Inaustry tne 
government have announced that they intend to proceed "briskly" with a 
programme of privatisation. This word has many different meanings, but it 
broadly corresponds to what twenty years ago would have been called de-
nationalisation. In pursuit of this programme, the government have already 
sold off their majority shareholdings in Amersham, Britoil, Cable & 
Wireless, ana Associated British Ports. 
The timetable for the disposal of other major public enterprises is as 
follows. This year, the government hope to pass legislation enabling the 
sale of their shareholdings in British Telecom and British Airways, the 
oilfields of British Gas, the Sealink services of British Rail, the repair 
yards of British Shipbuilders, and the Royal Ordnance Factories. Next year, 
it is intended to sell the Jaguar, Land Rover, and Unipart divisions of BL, 
the National Bus Company (the fate of the Scottish Transport Group remains 
unknown), the British Airports Authority, and the warship yards of Britisn 
Shipbuilders. (The sale of Scott Lithgow seems to have been as unplanned as 
the nationalisation of Rolls Royce in 19YO Some time (unspecified) it is 
intended to dispose of British Steel, British Rail, British Gas, Rolls 
Royce, and the rest of BL. The other major publicly-owned enterprises i.e. 
the National Coal Board, the Post Office and the CEGB are not mentioned at 
all in the goverment's programme, and therefore their place in the timetable 
may be presumed to fall under the heading of "never". 
It is difficult to discover any rationale in the order of priority which the 
government have set themselves for the process of privatisation. For 
example, Beesley & Littlechild (Lloyds Bank Review No. 149 July 1983) who 
are sympathetic to the idea of privatisation (indeed both authors were 
separately commissioned by the government to carry out independent studies 
of the future of the telecommunications industry) conclude that "the bulk of 
the consumer benefits that can be expected to follow from privatisation 
could be achieved by appropriately designed policies for five 
industries alone". These five industries are the CEGB, Britisn Teiecom, 
the National Coal Board, British Rail and the Post Office". Of these five, 
British Telecom appears on this year's list, British Rail appears in the 
government's "sometime" list, while the other three industries apparently 
fall into the "never" category. 
concepts: the fore of ownership on the one hand (i.ewnether an enterprise 
is publicly or privately owned), and the form of market organisation on the 
other.Q.e. whether an enterprise operates in a competitive or monopolistic 
environment) People confused about this distinction are therefore unable 
to distinguisn between the "privatisation" of an organisation (that is tne 
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t r a n s f e r of t h e o w n e r s h i p of t h e e n t e r p r i s e from p u b l i c t o p r i v a t e hands) 
and t h e " l i b e r a l i s a t i o n " of an e n t e r p r i s e or o r g a n i s a t i o n , ( t h a t i s t he 
breaking or eroding of a monopoly whether i t be pub l ic ly or p r i v a t e l y owned) 
to enable a g r e a t e r degree of compet i t ion in the supply of the goods and/or 
s e r v i c e s t h a t i t p r o d u c e s . The p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t an o r g a n i s a t i o n might 
remain in p u b l i c o w n e r s h i p w h i l e be ing f u l l y exposed t o t h e v a g a r i e s of 
market f o r c e s , wi thout any more p r o t e c t i o n or r e g u l a t i o n than t h a t accorded 
i t s p r iva te ly -owned compe t i to r s i s e i t h e r ignored or dismissed out of hand. 
S t a t e owned e n t e r p r i s e s in B r i t a i n vary c o n s i d e r a b l y in t h e d e g r e e of 
c o m p e t i t i o n which they f a c e , or t o put t h e m a t t e r a n o t h e r way in t h e form of 
t h e o r g a n i s a t i o n of t h e marke t w i t h i n wnich they o p e r a t e . To t h e e x t e n t 
t h a t t he p u b l i c l y owned e n t e r p r i s e s which the government i n t e n d s t o 
p r i v a t i s e are a t the compe t i t i ve end of the market o r g a n i s a t i o n a l spectrum 
(such as B r i t i s h Airways) t he r e seems to be no p a r t i c u l a r reason, from the 
p o i n t of view of t h e p u b l i c i n t e r e s t , why t h e i r o w n e r s h i p shou ld be 
t r a n s f e r r e d i n t o p r i v a t e hands. If r e t a i n e d in pub l i c ownership they should 
not be t r e a t e d as B r i t i s h Ai rways have been in t h e p a s t , w i t h t h e i r l o s s e s 
be ing made up by t h e T r e a s u r y , and t h e i r p r o f i t s ( i f any) going back i n t o 
t h e T r e a s u r y ' s maw. They must be t r e a t e d a t a r m ' s l e n g t h , a s a r e BP, and 
allowed to go bankrupt if necessary . 
For those s ta te-owned e n t e r p r i s e s which are a t the monopol i s t ic end of tne 
spectrum, such as B r i t i s h Gas or B r i t i s h Telecom, then t r a d i t i o n a l economic 
theory sugges t s t h a t the publ ic i n t e r e s t w i l l be bes t served not by changing 
t h e i r form of o w n e r s h i p , bu t by chang ing t h e form of o r g a n i s a t i o n of t he 
market in wnich they o p e r a t e , so t h a t they a re f u l l y exposed to compet i t ion . 
In o t h e r w o r d s , they shou ld not be p r i v a t i s e d , bu t l i b e r a l i s e d . If t he 
r h e t o r i c of t h i s government was t o be b e l i e v e d , i t would be supposed t h a t 
they had understood the b e n e f i t s and advantages of compe t i t ion . However i t 
a p p e a r s t h a t they a r e opposed no t j u s t t o bad economic t h e o r y but t o any 
economic theory a t a l l . 
I t may be argued t h a t t r e a t i n g publ ic ly-owned e n t e r p r i s e s on the same b a s i s 
as p r iva te ly-owned ones w i l l not work, because p o l i t i c i a n s w i l l not be able 
to r e s i s t the t empta t i on of i n t e rven ing in the a f f a i r s of these companies in 
o r d e r t o ga in some p o l i t i c a l a d v a n t a g e . So long as t h e r e i s a c l e a r l y 
understood a rms- leng th po l i cy , such as ope ra t e s in the case of BP, t h i s need 
not happen. But i f t he r e should be any wor r i e s on t h i s score they could be 
diminished by the e s t ab l i shmen t of a s t a t e i n d u s t r i a l holding company which 
would ope ra t e l i k e any o ther conglomerate on s t r i c t l y commercial l i n e s . I t 
may be asked, why bother to r e t a i n such e n t e r p r i s e s in publ ic ownership a t 
a l l ? Why not j u s t s e l l them off for whatever the market p r i c e w i l l f e tch? 
There a r e s e v e r a l r e a s o n s why t h e s t a t e should r e t a i n o w n e r s h i p of a 
s u b s t a n t i a l number of e n t e r p r i s e s ( p a r t i c u l a r l y l a r g e e n t e r p r i s e s ) in a 
modern advanced economy. There i s in p a r t i c u l a r t he a r g u m e n t , f i r s t 
advanced by Walras , t h a t p r o f i t s are composed l a r g e l y of r e n t s , and t h a t the 
b e n e f i t s shou ld t h e r e f o r e a c c r u e t o t h e community as a whole . In t h e 
p resen t age, where t e c h n i c a l change, market s i z e and government r e g u l a t i o n 
br ing windfa l l p r o f i t s as wej.1 as p o l i t i c a l inf luence to l a r g e c o r p o r a t i o n s , 
l a r g e c o n c e n t r a t i o n s of power are i n c r e a s i n g l y unacceptable . Those who are 
f a m i l i a r w i t h t h e b e h a v i o u r of l a r g e p u b l i c l y - owned c o r p o r a t i o n s in t h e 
advanced c o u n t r i e s w i l l be aware of the p r a c t i c e of such c o r p o r a t i o n s of 
p u t t i n g t ne i n t e r e s t s of t h e i r s t a f f - e s p e c i a l l y t h e i r senior s t a f f - ahead 
of t h e i n t e r e s t s of t h e i r c u s t o m e r s . I t i s i m p o r t a n t t o u n d e r s t a n d , 
however, t h a t t h i s p r a c t i c e a r i s e s not because the e n t e r p r i s e in ques t ion i s 
publ ic ly-owned, but because i t i s a monopoly p ro tec ted by the s t a t e . Once 
again , one must not confuse the p r i n c i p l e of ownership wi th the p r i n c i p l e of 
o r g a n i s a t i o n . 
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To r epea t , publicly-owned e n t e r p r i s e s should be t r e a t e d no d i f f e r e n t l y from 
privately-owned e n t e r p r i s e s . The government should in te rvene to ensure t ha t 
the market mechanism opera tes in accordance with the c l a s s i c a l p r i n c i p l e s of 
c o m p e t i t i o n : i t should in o t h e r words be the f u n c t i o n of government to 
e n s u r e t h a t in every s e c t o r of economic a c t i v i t y t h e r e should e x i s t 
s u f f i c i e n t d i v e r s i t y of thought and decis ion t ha t innovation i s encouraged 
and change i s a c c e p t e d . Government i n t e r v e n t i o n should be a c t i v e l y , 
p r i n c i p a l l y and c o n t i n u o u s l y d i r e c t e d t o the o p e r a t i o n of t h i s p r i n c i p l e , 
e n t i r e l y i r r e s p e c t i v e of ques t ions of ownership. 
That t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n between the form of ownersh ip and form of market 
o rgan i sa t i on i s of more than academic importance may be seen by examining 
the case of B r i t i s h Telecom. At the present time t h i s i s the second l a r g e s t 
of a i l t h e p u b l i c l y - o w n e d u n d e r t a k i n g s in t h i s c o u n t r y , wi th an annual 
t u r n o v e r of a lmos t £6,000m, and employing a workforce of 246,000 peop l e . 
The 1y8l Telecommunications Act permi t ted a small degree of l i b e r a l i s a t i o n 
of the BT monopoly without touching the question of ownership. The idea of 
a change of owne r sh ip ( i . e . " p r i v a t i s a t i o n " ) did not appear to be env i sagea 
when the 1981 Act was being pa s sed , and t h e r e f o r e i t was someth ing of a 
s u r p r i s e when the d e c i s i o n t o p r i v a t i s e was announced in t he House of 
Commons on 19 Ju ly 1982. The case for p r i v a t i s i n g was then argued a lmos t 
s o l e l y on t h e grounds t h a t t he c u r r e n t method then be ing used by B r i t i s h 
Telecom to f inance i t s investment programme was unacceptable . Government 
r e s t r i c t i o n s on publ ic sec tor borrowing forced BT to finance investment from 
revenues, and, the then Secretary for Indus t ry , Mr Pa t r ick Jenkin argued, BT 
found investment c a p i t a l not by increas ing ef f ic iency and cu t t i ng c o s t s but 
by i n c r e a s i n g c h a r g e s t o i t s c u s t o m e r s . S e l l i n g 51% of BT, he conc luded , 
would allow i t to borrow in the market place without publ ic sec to r borrowing 
r e s t r i c t i o n s . Subject ing BT to "proper market d i s c i p l i n e " a l so obliged the 
corpora t ion to improve i t s i n t e r n a l ef f ic iency and cost e f f ec t i venes s . 
In f a c t , t h e amount of market d i s c i p l i n e a c t u a l l y env i saged in t he f u t u r e 
r e g u l a t e d p r i v a t e monopoly i s r e a l l y q u i t e s m a l l . The 1983 b i l l e n a b l i n g 
the p r i v a t i s a t i o n of B r i t i s h Telecom does not envisage the r e s t r u c t u r i n g of 
t h e o r g a n i s a t i o n i s any s i g n i f i c a n t way, so t h a t in t h e words of the 
Financ ia l Times " t h e r e i s t he r i s k t h a t B r i t i s h Telecom w i l l s imply be 
t r a n s f o r m e d from a p u b l i c i n t o a p r i v a t e monopoly wi th an i n a d e q u a t e 
r egu la to ry system." While doing l i t t l e to encourage compet i t ion , the 1983 
b i l l does provide for t i g h t e r r egu l a t i on on the forthcoming p r i v a t e monopoly 
as compared t o t he e x i s t i n g p u b l i c monopoly. This i s the more i r o n i c in 
view of another repeated j u s t i f i c a t i o n for p r i v a t i s a t i o n which i s offered by 
government m i n i s t e r s , namely t h a t i t w i l l reduce p o l i t i c a l i n t e r f e r e n c e in 
t h e e n t e r p r i s e concerned as w e l l as improving t h e q u a l i t y of management. 
Once the government goes down the road of increased regu la t ion r a the r than 
t h a t of i n c r e a s e d c o m p e t i t i o n , then t h e d i s c i p l i n e s of the market w i l l be 
modified, while those of the publ ic sec to r w i l l no longer apply. I t seems 
l i k e l y t h a t the customer, p a r t i c u l a r l y the domestic consumer, w i l l in many 
c a s e s pay more fo r reduced s e r v i c e s , w h i l e l o s i n g a l l i n f l u e n c e over the 
behav iou r and p o l i c i e s of t he c o n t i n u i n g monopoly. There a r e t h e r e f o r e 
s i g n i f i c a n t r i s k s t h a t the f u t u r e p r i v a t e l y - o w n e d B r i t i s h Telecom, as 
organised in the manner out l ined by the 1983 b i l l , w i l l produce the worst of 
both worlds . 
While the word " p r i v a t i s a t i o n " r e a l l y has the i n d u s t r i a l connotat ion of the 
t r a n s f e r of o w n e r s h i p , in the case of the s e r v i c e s e c t o r s i t has come to 
mean d i f f e r e n t t h i n g s , e spec i a l l y in the r h e t o r i c of government m i n i s t e r s . 
In t he ca se of h e a l t h s e r v i c e s , i t a p p e a r s to mean the encouragement of a 
g r e a t e r number of p r i v a t e l y - o w n e d h o s p i t a l s and c l i n i c s , as w e i l as the 
p o s s i b i l i t y of s w i t c h i n g a l l or p a r t of NHS funding to an i n s u r a n c e 
p r i n c i p l e . I t i s no t easy to f i t t he Na t iona l Heal th S e r v i c e i n t o a 
monopoly-competit ion spectrum, s ince the p ic tu re i s completely d i s t o r t e d by 
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s u b s i d y . S i n c e m o s t NHS 
Ly-c o n e s . 
P u b l i c l y owned h o u s i n g s e r v i c e s a r e n o t p r o v i d e d f r e e of c h a r g e , b u t a t a 
s u b s i d i s e d r a t e . The m a r k e t f o r t h e p r o v i s i o n of p r i v a t e l y owned h o u s i n g 
s e r v i c e s ( t h e r e n t a l m a r k e t ) h a s v i r t u a l l y c e a s e d t o e x i s t , t h a n k s t o 
g o v e r n m e n t r e g u l a t i o n s , bu t o w n e r - o c c u p a t i o n ( a l s o s u b s i d i s e d ) a p p e a r s t o be 
on an i n c r e a s i n g t r e n d a s i n c o m e s r i s e . 
I t i s s o m e t i m e a r g u e d t h a t r a i l w a y s and e l e c t r i c i t y s u p p l y m u s t a l w a y s 
r e m a i n i n p u b l i c o w n e r s h i p s i n c e t h e y a r e " n a t u r a l m o n o p o l i e s " . I n f a c t , 
t h e r e i s no r e a s o n why c o m p e t i t i o n s h o u l d n o t be r e s t o r e d by a p o l i c y of 
f r a n c h i s i n g , s u c h a s i s a l r e a d y a p p l i e d t o t h e s u p p l y of c o m m e r c i a l 
t e l e v i s i o n and c o m m e r c i a l a v i a t i o n s e r v i c e s . The i n t r o d u c t i o n of c o m p e t i -
t i o n i n t h e s e s e c t o r s would no t o n l y p r o d u c e an a g r e e a b l e i m p r o v e m e n t i n t h e 
r e s p o n s i v e n e s s of t h e s u p p l i e r t o consumer w i s h e s (and anyone who h a s e v e r 
had t o d e a l w i t h an e l e c t r i c i t y b o a r d o r gas boa rd w i l l u n d e r s t a n d what t h i s 
means) b u t i t s h o u l d a l s o l e a d t o f u t u r e i m p r o v e m e n t s in t e c h n i c a l i n n o v a -
t i o n s and c o s t - c u t t i n g . I t would a l s o d i m i n i s h t h e t e n d e n c y of t h e s t a f f of 
such m o n o p o l i e s t o make i n v e s t m e n t d e c i s i o n s which enhance t h e i r p r e s t i g e 
( such a s t h e b u i l d i n g of l a r g e b u t u n n e c e s s a r y power s t a t i o n s ) wh ich i s i n 
e v i d e n c e i n t h i s c o u n t r y , b u t h a s r e a c h e d i t s apogee i n F r a n c e . 
To r e c a p i t u l a t e , t h e a r g u m e n t of t h i s a r t i c l e c o u l d be s u m m a r i s e d i n t h e 
f o l l o w i n g way: 
C\> E x c e p t i n v e r y s p e c i a l c a s e s , s u c h a s d e f e n c e , t h e r e i s no need 
f o r l e g i s l a t i o n on t h e s u b j e c t of t h e fo rm of o w n e r s h i p of 
p a r t i c u l a r o r g a n s a t i o n s of p r o d u c t i o n . T h e r e f o r e t h e e x i s t i n g and 
p r o p o s e d p r i v a t i s a t i o n m e a s u r e s a s t h e y a p p l y t o i n d u s t r y a r e 
r e d u n d a n t from t h e p o i n t of view of t h e p u b l i c i n t e r e s t . 
( 2 ) T h e r e i s a v e r y c o n s i d e r a b l e need f o r a much s t r i c t e r p o l i c y on 
t h e p r o m o t i o n of c o m p e t i t i o n , w h i c h s h o u l d a p p l y e q u a l l y t o a l l 
o r g a n i s a t i o n s , w h e t h e r t hey be p r i v a t e l y or p u b l i c l y owned. T h i s 
w o u l d i n c l u d e t h e r e m o v a l of a r t i f i c i a l r e s t r i c t i o n s on e n t r y , 
v a r i o u s f o r m s of t a r i f f and n o n - t a r i f f p r o t e c t i o n , and a l s o 
s u b s i d i e s e x c e p t f o r t h o s e d i r e c t e d t o s p e c i f i c , t e m p o r a r y and 
w e l l - d e f i n e d o b j e c t i v e s . 
( 3 ; In p a r t i c u l a r , p r o t e c t i o n from a i l m o n o p o l i e s s h o u l d be w i t h d r a w n . 
T h i s m e a n s t h a t p u b l i c l y owned e n t e r p r i s e s s h o u l d n e i t h e r h a v e 
t h e i r p r o f i t s c o n f i s c a t e d by t h e T r e a s u r y , n o r s h o u l d t h e y be 
b a i l e d o u t when t h e y go b a n k r u p t . 
I n o t h e r w o r d s t h e r e i s a s t r o n g c a s e i n t h e p u b l i c i n t e r e s t f o r t h e 
g o v e r n m e n t t o p u r s u e a p r o g r a m m e of l i b e r a l i s a t i o n , r a t h e r t h a n 
p r i v a t i s a t i o n . U n f o r t u n a t e l y , t h e p r e s e n t g o v e r n m e n t seems t o have con fused 
t h e two t h i n g s , which b o t h in t h e o r y and in p r a c t i c e a r e q u i t e d i s t i n c t . 
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